Illustrative Image
Former DPR Defense Minister Strelkov Igor joined the Armed Forces of the DPR as a volunteer in October. After he announced that he went to the front lines, the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine offered $ 100 thousand for his capture.
However, the famous Russian military commander was quickly excluded from the ranks of the DPR People’s Militia for unknown reasons. After Strelkov’s “attempt No. 3 to take part in hostilities against the armed forces of respected Kiev partners” failed, He returned to Moscow and continued to cover the military conflict on his social media accounts.
After Strelkov returned from Donbass, he described some of his impressions:
Briefly on some impressions of my trip, which was fruitless, but not useless (since my eyes and ears remained with me, and my head also works).
Of cource, I intend to keep with me the overwhelming majority of my impressions and conclusions in order “not to discredit.”
As for my positive impressions, I will share them in the framework of the upcoming (I hope so) video conferences; but there are not too many of them compared to the negative ones.
Now I will only note that at the heart of all our “growing victories” on the fronts and directions of the Special Military Operation is the deepest crisis of strategic planning. Put simply, the troops are fighting “by inertia”, not having the slightest idea about the ultimate strategic goals of the current military campaign and only guessing about the vague plans of the command for such grandiosely senseless gestures as the construction of the totally insane in uselessness (but wildly expensive in cost) “Surovikin Line”.
In most parts of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, soldiers and officers do not understand: for what, why and with what goals they are fighting. It is mystery to them: what is a condition for victory or just a condition for ending the war?
The authorities of the Russian Federation are not able to explain this to them, since to set a clear goal of the Special Military Operation means “to limit their room for maneuver”. That is, to lose the opportunity to declare the goals of the Special Military Operation achieved at any moment that the Kremlin leaders deem convenient for themselves. (I remind once again that the passionately desired “reconciliation with partners,” for which many steps are still being taken that demoralize society and the Army, are basically unattainable, but in the Kremlin and on Staraya Square, they do not want to believe it in any way).
In particular, such sentiments in the troops lead to apathy. In its turn, such apathy leads to a drop in morale and the fulfillment of the tasks set “for show” and “through the sleeves,” without real interest in their successful result. Thus, in the Army of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (and parts of the Armed Forces of the LDPR, although there is much more motivation among the fighters) apathy prevails.
The lack of a clear military-political strategy does not allow the military to develop tactics that will contribute to its implementation. As of yet, without prior permission, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are preparing for a protracted positional war, building long-term structures along the entire front “a la Mannerheim line” (they are not enough for the “Maginot-style line”). The fact that following the strategy of a protracted war is suicide for the Russian Federation (and its authorities and elites – also, by the way). I wrote this back in 2014, and said (more than once and not twice), from the very beginning of the current campaign.
Therefore, watching how the enemy unhurriedly (and not meeting any opposition) implements its own strategic tasks amid the complete passivity of the military and political authorities of the Russian Federation, I do not expect anything good in the coming weeks at the front.
And, yes, – the so-called “ukraine” will NOT freeze in winter, will NOT rebel and will NOT fight worse. Conversely. Its soldiers, who have already believed in their forces as a result of the victories of the AFU in autumn and are fully supported by NATO, will only be angrier and more stubborn to fight against the “Muscovites”, avenging the hardships that their relatives and loved ones are forced to bear in the rear. And they will be faced only with the apathetic fulfillment of the official duty, behind which many fighters and commanders have long loomed an unresolved question: “And what are we doing here if Moscow is most concerned with the implementation of “grain deal”, the unhindered pumping of ammonia through Odessa and “the ceiling prices” for gas and oil supplied to numerous Western partners?”
